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Abstract  
This paper discusses globalization’s impact on production and distribution systems in 
emerging economies. On one hand, globalization has resulted in an increasing 
number of multinational corporations to adopt a platform strategy for their customers 
in emerging markets. On the other hand, developing countries have witnessed the 
integration of an increasing number of traditional marketplaces into a powerful 
distribution system, characterized as a specialized market system. Consequently, an 
unique industrial organization has developed in emerging economies, regarded as 
emerging global value chains (EGVCs). They comprise a large number of small 
firms together with a small number of large platform providers and display the 
“market” type general governance patterns. Firms in EGVCs are more likely to 
realize functional upgrading and grow into strong lead firms. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper discusses the impact of globalization on the production and distribution 
systems in emerging economies. Up to the 1990s, globalization was undoubtedly 
dominated by multinational corporations (MNCs). These corporations concentrated on 
the high value-added segments of value chains, such as research and development 
(R&D) on core technology and key components as well as branding and marketing 
activities, while extending their production network to developing countries. On one 
hand, MNCs manufacture cheaper products using local production resources, while on 
the other, they sell these products to developed countries and high-end markets in 
developing countries via their own sales networks. Given their experience with aspects 
of the production and distribution chain, firms from developing countries can increase 
growth opportunities by trading with and learning from MNCs (Gereffi 1999; 
Humphrey and Schmitz 2000, 2002; Gereffi, Humphrey, and Sturgeon 2005) 
Since 2000, however, a new type of economic globalization has emerged. An apparent 
change is that trade between emerging economies has substantially increased. From 
2000 to 2010, trade between developing countries accounted for 15%–29% of the world’s 
total trade volume (United Nations, various years)1. Interestingly, the 2008 global 
financial crisis only accelerated this trend.  
We argue that this phenomenon reflects the emergence of a new type of global value 
chain that is primarily characterized by firms in developing countries (with a special 
emphasis of Chinese firms), without the active participation of MNCs acting as lead 
firms. In this paper, this phenomenon is referred to as Emerging Global Value Chains 
                                                   
1 The data of developing countries is calculated based on data of world total and developed 
countries. Developing countries here are regarded as the rest of the world besides developed 
countries. 
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(EGVCs)2. 
Unlike traditional global value chains, EGVCs primarily constitute countless 
indigenous local firms, including both suppliers and lead firms. For example, Yiwu, 
China, holds the world’s largest industrial and commercial cluster of daily necessities, 
where 70,000 shopkeepers trade with 210,000 merchants from emerging markets each 
day (Ding 2012). China’s mobile phone industry is characterized by 2000 integrators 
and 500 design houses in Shenzhen and Shanghai.3 Nearly half of their products are 
sold in emerging markets (Ding and Pan 2013). Similar patterns can be observed in 
many of China’s industries such as consumer electronics (e.g., MP3 players, DVD 
players.), automobiles, motorcycles, bicycles and apparels.4  
Firms in developing countries face several obstacles to their active participation in 
international trade and global production. They generally lack core competence in value 
chain segments such as R&D, design, branding, and marketing. The considerable 
differences in demand structures between developed and emerging economies make it 
far more difficult to conduct effective marketing activities in the latter (Karnani 2007). 
                                                   
2 The term of EGVC is originated from the term of “Shanzhai system”. In Ding and Pan 
(2013, p.132), Shanzhai system is defined as an industrial system, “which is low-end market 
oriented and is formed by a large number of loosely connected SMEs and a small number of 
platform providers who bear huge fixed costs.” This paper further developed this concept as 
EGVC in the context of GVC theory. 
A similar concept concerning EGVC is the National Value Chains (NVCs). This paper uses 
Emerging Global Value Chains (EGVC), rather than NVCs because of the following reasons. 
First, although EGVCs are originated from domestic market, they have been already 
extended to emerging markets. Second, EGVC is still rapidly growing and expanding. The 
term “emerging” will reflect the unique dynamics of EGVC. For the discussion on NVCs, see 
the literature review by Navas- Alemán (2006). 
3 In developed countries, a mobile phone company as a lead firm generally combines the 
functions of integrators and design houses. In China, however, mobile phone companies 
have been separated into integrators and design houses. We thus treat both integrators and 
design houses as lead firms in this paper. 
4 For the consumer electronics industry, see Ding (2013a); for the automobile industry, see 
Marukawa (2007: Chapter 4); for the motorcycle industry, see Ohara (2006) and Fujita 
(2013); for the bicycle industry, see Watanabe, Zhou, and Komagata (2009); and for the 
apparel industry, see Ding (2012). 
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This paper’s key research question is thus how these newly emerging firms, despite 
very poor capabilities, manage to overcome various technological and marketing 
barriers to rapidly become the key players in EGVCs. The answer to this question will 
enrich our understanding of globalization and industrial organization, adding to our 
understanding of industry dynamics in developing countries. 
Thus far, EGVC-related studies have been primarily conducted by Japanese research 
groups that used fieldwork as the research method to collect cases. We base our 
discussion on empirical evidence provided by these studies. As the following sections 
demonstrate, these in-depth case studies repeatedly remind us that explaining the 
profound meaning of EGVCs requires modifications to existing global value chain 
theories together with development of a new framework. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the features 
and gaps of existing Global Value Chain (GVC) theory and highlights that platform 
makes a good complementary theory for understanding EGVCs. Sections 3 and 4 
discuss the role of technology platforms and market platforms in EGVCs, respectively. 
Sections 5 and 6 focus on governance and upgrading issues in EGVCs, respectively. 
Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Theoretical Framework 
2.1 Preconditions of existing global value chain theory 
GVC theory is the most influential explanatory paradigm for examining the impacts 
of trade and production globalization on industrial organization patterns. As Gereffi 
(1999, p.41) highlights, “‘Globalization’ is much more recent than internationalization 
because it implies the functional integration and coordination of internationally 
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dispersed activities.” Sharing this common understanding concerning integration and 
coordination, Gereffi, Humphrey, and Sturgeon (2005), pioneers of the classic GVC 
literature, distinguish five distinct GVC governance patterns—Market, Modular, 
Relational, Captive, and Hierarchy. They further identify three significant variables 
determining how global value chains are governed and change, namely complexity of 
transactions, ability to codify transactions, and capabilities in the supply-base. 
GVC theory has two important preconditions, which accurately describe the real 
trade situation between developed and developing countries; however, they are 
gradually being challenged by EGVC emergence.  
The first precondition is that the lead firms of GVC are primarily MNCs with strong 
organizational capabilities to conduct R&D, branding, marketing, and supply chain 
management. In the EGVC paradigm, however, indigenous local lead firms are key 
players, despite them being relatively small and having poor capabilities. Fujita (2013, 
p.6) clearly highlighted that in the context of developing countries, a “lead firm may be 
constrained by a shortage of capability in its attempt to establish certain types of chain 
governance.” From this perspective, this study identified two variables, namely “the 
alignment of relevant capabilities” and “the nature of product/process parameter” that 
can be used to redefine the five governance patterns proposed by Gereffi, Humphrey, 
and Sturgeon (2005). Similarly, Marukawa (2013) highlighted that lead firms’ 
capabilities can be considered as a major difference in value chain governance between 
Chinese firms and those in developed countries. He further argues that within value 
chains having Chinese firms as the lead firms, suppliers from developed countries 
usually have more resources than these Chinese firms. The suppliers thus often must 
provide various technical and design information to support their Chinese customers. 
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Marukawa (2013) called this type of value chain a “supportive” value chain. 
  GVC theory’s second precondition is that it mainly targets markets in developed 
countries. As Gereffi, Humphrey, and Sturgeon (2005, p.99) state, “one of the key 
findings of valued chain studies is that access to developed country market has become 
increasingly dependent on participating in global production networks led by firms 
based in developed countries.” On the contrary, firms in an EGVC aim primarily at 
emerging markets, in which both demand quality and size are structurally different. 
Emerging markets have several distinct traits. First, a large marketing bottleneck 
exists for emerging-market-oriented businesses. As Karnari (2007, p.91) highlighted, 
emerging markets are constrained by low-income earning consumers. Because 
urbanization is less advanced, consumers in emerging markets—with the exception of 
the urban poor—are geographically dispersed and culturally heterogeneous.5 Karnani 
(2007, p.91) thus argues that the cost of serving markets at “the bottom of the pyramid” 
can be very high, making profits unlikely, especially for large MNCs. In spite of this 
situation, existing GVC theory, with production side concentration, lacks a framework 
to analyze a distribution system. 
Second, the demands in emerging markets are changing dynamically. As a result of 
economic growth, the quality of demands in emerging markets is continuously 
upgrading. On the other hand, the size of emerging markets expands rapidly. Since 
markets in developed countries are of relatively stable sizes, GVC theory thus focuses 
more on the qualitative aspect of demand (complexity of transactions) while avoiding 
                                                   
5 Due to this point, a number of scholars treat emerging markets as long tail markets (Gao 
2011; Liu and Luo 2010). We acknowledge that a long tail market does share some qualities 
of emerging market in some perspectives. However, since the demand in emerging markets 
is hierarchical, its quality is continuously upgrading, and its size changes rapidly; these two 
concepts are thus essentially different and should not be confused. 
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deep investigation into the impact of rapid market expansion on industrial 
organization. 
Based on the above two preconditions, GVC theory argues that globalization can help 
firms from developing countries to upgrade by entering MNCs’ supply chain. To meet 
the strict quality standards in developed countries, they must frequently exchange 
knowledge and information with MNCs, and must repeatedly receive instructions from 
them. Through this dynamic learning process, they will eventually improve their 
capabilities in various value chain segments (Gereffi 1999). 
Regarding this point, however, a theoretical study by Humphrey and Schmitz (2000), 
as well as empirical studies by Bazan, Luiza, and Navas-Alemán (2004) and 
Navas-Alemán (2006) have concluded that GVCs have only limited ability to improve 
firm capabilities. The governance pattern between firms in developing countries and 
MNCs is mostly captive (known as quasi-hierarchical in some literature). Under captive 
relations, firms can engage in process upgrading and product upgrading, but functional 
upgrading remains difficult. Firms in an EGVC, however, can improve capabilities and 
upgrade various functions, such as R&D, design, branding, and marketing (for details, 
see following sections). Therefore, a thorough study on EGVC will help us consider the 
impact of globalization on developing countries firms from a broader perspective.6 
 
2.2 Platform theory 
                                                   
6 Current discussions on functional upgrading in firms from developing countries primarily 
focus on design, but lack depth when investigating R&D. This omission reflects the fact that 
current case studies are concentrated in industries requiring design capabilities such as 
apparel, shoes, and furniture, while R&D is not as important as in hi-tech industries. On the 
other hand, most firms from developing countries remain at the technology transfer stage. It 
is therefore rare for them to undertake costly levels of R&D by themselves. As the case of 
mobile phones suggests, however, along with the appearance of technology platforms, the 
technological barriers for firms from developing countries have become progressively lower, 
although these firms may still only be able to undertake simple and peripheral R&D. 
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We argue that the introduction of platform theory will help resolve the issues related 
to the limitations of the existing GVC framework, providing a more robust 
understanding of the nature of EGVCs. In recent years, platform theory has become an 
advanced research field in industrial organization, strategic management, and 
innovation theory (Gawer 2009a). In practice, the success of Microsoft, Intel, and Google 
has inspired an increasing number of MNCs to adopt platform strategy to acquire a 
dominant market position (Gawer and Cusumano 2002; Cusmano 2011, Chapter 1). 
Baldwin and Woodard (2009, p.19) define a platform as “a set of stable components 
that supports variety and evolvability in a system by constraining the linkages among 
the other components.” Gawer (2009b, p.57) defined a platform as “building blocks that 
act as a foundation upon which other firms can develop complimentary products, 
technologies or services.” Maruyama (2007) defined a platform as “a foundation (lower 
structure) that defines other layers or components within an industry or a system 
product and which consists of multiple layers or complementary components.” From 
these definitions, a platform serves as the most stable part of an industry or system 
product that can be shared by various platform users and be reused several times.  
Existing literature on platform theory concentrates on hi-tech sectors in developed 
countries. Platform is regarded as a strategy to aid complex product systems (or 
industry) to continuously respond to dynamic changes and increased variety of demand 
(Baldwin and Woodard 2009). In contrast, we argue that the EGVC perspective 
indicates that a platform is meant to primarily resolve the issues related to capability 
shortages experienced by firms from developing countries. As Ding and Pan (2012) 
argue, in emerging markets, “the overwhelming majority of the economic actors are 
countless small merchants, small producers, and their reserve army. These small 
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firms….are not only deficient in production equipment and technological knowledge, 
but also lack the means of marketing and purchasing. Platforms, in this sense, can 
precisely complement the poor managerial resources of these firms and reduce the 
technological and marketing barriers for them.” 
 Applying platform theory to the real-world case of EGVCs, the role of platforms in 
complementing the capabilities of firms in developing countries can be categorized into 
three points. 
First, through platform sharing, platform users can reduce fixed costs (Ghosh and 
Morita 2007, Baldwin and Woodard 2009, p.22). Firms in developing countries generally 
lack sufficient funds to conduct R&D, design, or marketing because they require 
considerable initial investments but offer unpredictable returns. Using a platform, 
firms in developing countries as platform users can enjoy the results of R&D, design, or 
marketing generated by platform providers while avoiding their own fixed-cost 
investment.7 
  Second, a platform’s design architecture can help firms in developing countries 
handle complicated transactions. Related literature stresses that the platformization of 
either key components or technology will transform the finished product’s architecture 
from integral to modular (Baldwin and Woodard 2009, Tatsumoto, Ogawa and Fujimoto 
2009). As each component in a modularized product has a standardized interface that 
facilitates connections, firms in developing countries find it easier to assemble platform 
and other peripheral components into complicated finished products. 
Third, in most cases, platforms generate network effects (direct or indirect network 
                                                   
7 Watanabe (2013a) argues that Chinese firms pursue a common strategy to save R&D and 
marketing costs through platform sharing. 
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effects).8 This will help firms in developing countries improve capabilities in two ways: 
1. The network effect is a mechanism through which network members share 
information and knowledge, thus forming a learning process that may help them 
improve capabilities regarding platform use and platform-based complementary 
innovation. 
2. The network effect is a positive feedback mechanism through which network 
members attract each other, thereby constantly expanding the network size. 
Therefore, it is likely to help platform users respond to the expanding demand 
typical of dynamic emerging markets. 
The relationships between platforms and GVCs have not been sufficiently discussed 
so far. Gawer (2009b) classified four types of platforms—internal, supply chain, industry, 
and multisided. From this typology, we can implicitly determine that the governance 
pattern for internal platforms is hierarchy, while it is modular, relational, or captive for 
supply chain platforms. Platform users and providers for industry and multisided 
platforms may not understand each other; the corresponding governance pattern is thus 
estimated to be market.9 In summary, when combining platform theory with GVC 
literature, an investigation into the impact of platforms on value chain governance is 
indispensable. 
In keeping with the discussions of Ding and Pan (2012, 2013), this paper 
distinguishes between technology and market platforms in the context of emerging 
markets. The following sections provide a detailed analysis of how platforms help firms 
                                                   
8 The author’s understanding of the network effect in this paper is based on Evans (2009, 
104-105). However, there is debate as to whether the existence of an indirect network effect 
is a necessary and sufficient condition to define a two-sided platform or a multisided 
platform. For details, see Hagiu and Wright (2011). 
9 In this paper, we focus on the industry platform and the multisided platform, as the 
governance patterns in these platforms are usually market based (see Section 5). 
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expand and mature within EGVCs. 
 
3. Technology Platforms 
3.1 Technology platforms and firm capabilities 
From the technological perspective, firms in developing countries have deficient 
capabilities in the following two aspects: 
First, because R&D requires large amounts of both funding and research personnel, 
which are generally fixed costs, these firms cannot afford the R&D investment 
necessary for developing key components (Watanabe 2013a). 
Second, they lack sufficient abilities to coordinate complicated transaction 
relationships with key component makers. To retain fundamental functions of finished 
goods, however, complicated information regarding technology and design must be 
exchanged between finished goods assemblers and key component makers, and explicit 
coordination is indispensable. 
As suggested by existing studies, technology platforms can resolve the issues 
regarding the poor technological capabilities of firms in developing countries. 
In keeping with the discussions of Gawer and Cusumano (2002), Gawer and 
Henderson (2007), and Gawer (2009b), Ding and Pan (2013) define a technology 
platform as a key component or technology within a product or technology system that 
can be shared by various project teams within a firm, firms within a supply chain, or 
firms beyond the supply chain but within the same industry. In this paper, we focus on 
technology platforms shared by various firms beyond the supply chain but within the 
same industry—the so-called “industry platform” defined by Gawer (2009 b). Typical 
technology platforms include Intel’s platform that comprises the CPU and chipsets used 
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in personal computers (PCs), baseband IC chipsets used in mobile phones, and engines 
used in automobiles. The definition of a technology platform implies that firms in 
developing countries can avoid large R&D investments by sharing the same type of 
technology platform provided by outside company. 
  On the other hand, the platformization of a key component causes the change of 
design architecture, helping firms in developing countries save on explicit coordination 
costs, which is necessary for maintaining the basic functions of finished goods. 
Regarding this point, Tatsumoto, Ogawa, and Fujimoto (2009) investigated Intel’s 
case. Their study suggested that the architecture of the personal computer have long 
been quasi-modular. In the 1990s, Intel integrated the CPU and chipsets into a single 
platform that has fully standardized interfaces towards the outside. As a result of this 
platfomization, PCs have become completely modular, a change which has progressively 
lowered technology barriers, enabling firms in developing countries to easily assemble 
final-form PCs. On the other hand, the internal architecture of Intel’s platform has been 
completely transformed into integral10. 
Technology platforms usually generate direct network effects. When using the same 
type of technology platform, users can share platform-based R&D results as well as 
various knowhow or information concerning platform use with each other. The greater 
the number of platform users, the greater the availability of feedback that can be shared. 
Firm capabilities regarding platform-based R&D can thus gradually improve during 
this feedback process.  
                                                   
10 As integral architecture requires firms to effectively coordinate among various component 
makers and manage complicated transactions, firms in developing countries find it 
increasingly difficult to manufacture key component in the PC industry. From the 
experience of PC industry, Tatsumoto, Ogawa, and Fujimoto (2009) thus argue that a basic 
pattern of international division of labor—that firms in developed countries provide the 
technology platform, while those in developing countries specialize in finished product 
assembly—has been established. 
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3.2 Technology platforms in China 
Sharing key components has been broadly observed throughout China’s 
manufacturing sectors. If design drawings can be regarded as a technology platform, 
China’s manufacturing sectors have adopted the platform strategy since the planned 
economy period. China’s First Ministry of Machines and the Beijing Automobile 
Industry Corporation (a state-owned enterprise) held a joint meeting in 1975 (Tajima 
2003). A total of 47 auto parts and car makers were invited to attend this meeting; they 
were asked to manufacture a 2t small truck in which they were given the same design 
drawing derived from a model introduced by the Soviet Union. Clearly, the foundation of 
technology platform sharing can be traced to some practices conducted under China’s 
planned economic system. 
Thereafter, Ohara (2006) discovered that China’s motorcycle makers are sharing 
design drawings originally developed by Honda since 1990s. Marukawa (2007) reported 
various instances of key components sharing: the same type of cathode ray tube (CRT) 
in China’s television industry, compressors in the air conditioner industry, and engines 
in the automobile industry. These key components were initially provided by 
Japanese-funded makers in China, and were gradually provided by Chinese local firms 
in recent years. Key components sharing made hundreds of lead firms appeared within 
these industries. 
Since 2000, MNCs intentionally began to adopt the technology platform strategy for 
their Chinese customers, especially in the consumer electronics industry. Ding and Pan 
(2013) conducted a detailed study on the platform sharing phenomenon in the mobile 
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phone industry.11 They stated that Taiwanese firm Media Tek (MTK) is the most 
successful IC provider in China. Concerning feature phones, it acquired the highest 
market share of 80.5% in China in 2008, and its smartphones segment beat Qualcomm 
by 2012 to acquire a 50% market share in China.  
MTK began developing mobile phone chipsets for their Chinese customers in 2001; 
however, it soon found local design houses’ abilities to be rather poor. They were 
incapable of not only conducting some basic R&D activities but also of smoothly 
integrating an array of peripheral parts and software with MTK’s baseband IC. 
Therefore, MTK was forced to drastically extend their platform’s coverage. MTK 
undertook not only the IC and system designs but also part of the software design for 
the chipset. MTK also integrated the baseband IC and multimedia application processor 
into a single chipset platform, thus packaging the operating system, various 
applications (such as an MP3 player and phone camera driver), and sometimes the user 
interface into its chipset software. However, when MTK began to promote this platform, 
it still encountered various difficulties. Most local small firms lacked the ability to 
conduct PCB (Printed Circular Board) hardware design and software design on the 
basis of the MTK platform. To support them, MTK developed a turnkey solution, which 
contains the PCB hardware reference design, software source code, and other design 
notices for a complete mobile phone design. Therefore, design houses that adopted the 
MTK platform were able to start mass production in a very short timeframe.  
During the MTK platform sharing process, strong direct network effects arose. Most 
Chinese design houses have either directly or indirectly spun off from either ZTE or 
Motorola China. Moreover, many Chinese web forums facilitate engineers to freely 
                                                   
11 For MP3, DVD player, telephone, set-top box, and video camera industries, see Ding (2013 
a), for LCD television industry, see Watanabe (2013b). 
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exchange their experiences regarding mobile phone R&D on the basis of MTK platform. 
Furthermore, China’s mobile phone industry has highly advanced inter-firm labor 
markets. Job-hopping engineers often bring a software development kit, application 
software, or other R&D results from their previous employers to their new employer. 
This resulted in a free information sharing network between design house owners and 
engineers. The more design houses that adopt the MTK platform, the greater the 
number platform-based complementary innovation results available for sharing. 
Through mutual learning boosted by this positive feedback mechanism, design houses 
have increased capabilities to develop mobile phones based on MTK’s platform.  
From the case of mobile phone, however, three limitations of technology platform 
sharing must be highlighted. First, sharing key components implies that these products 
share generally similar basic functions, with only a few minor functions being 
differentiated. Second, because the technology platform has integrated most R&D 
processes, local firms are only able to accumulate capabilities in a narrow gap not 
covered by the technology platform—a limitation that has hampered their technological 
progress.12 Third, as the case of MTK indicated, information and knowledge sharing 
conducted through the direct network effect often infringe intellectual property rights. 
 
4. Market Platforms  
4.1 Market platforms and firm capabilities 
From a marketing perspective, developing countries firms often lack the capabilities 
to construct their own sales networks and collect demand information because these 
                                                   
12 For example, Longcheer, the leading design house in China, admitted that it has only 
accumulated some peripheral technologies (user interface design, noise reduction, etc.) 
during the process of adopting the MTK platform (Interview with two managers of 
Longcheer, December 2010). 
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processes require significant investment and repeated coordination. The features of 
demand in emerging markets further increase these marketing difficulties. 
As stated in Section 2, emerging market demand is geographically dispersed and 
culturally heterogeneous. Although overall demand is large, each consumer’s demand is 
small. Therefore, small-scale buyers as distributors are in the best position to meet 
demand in emerging markets, making the realization of economies of scale difficult in 
emerging markets (Karnari 2007). 
  Market platforms can resolve the issues related to the marketing capability shortages 
faced by firms in developing countries. A market platform is a market intermediary 
having a two-sided market characteristic. Hagiu (2007) classified two types of 
intermediation strategies—the merchant mode and the two-sided platform mode. In 
this study, as a corresponding term of the technology platform, we call two-sided 
platform a market platform.13 A pure merchant-mode intermediary such as Wal-Mart 
purchases goods to be sold to buyers at its own risk. In contrast, in the case of a 
two-sided platform mode intermediary, the platform owner simply provides a 
marketplace. Sellers operate shops directly in the marketplace and sell goods to buyers 
at their own risk. Typical market platforms include shopping malls, e-commerce 
websites, and trade fairs. In the case of developing countries, China’s specialized 
market is the most typical market platform. 
Similar to technology platforms, market platforms also exhibit a positive feedback 
mechanism proportional to the number of users, namely the indirect network effect. The 
                                                   
13 When the number of user groups exceeds three, the platform can be called multisided. We 
collectively refer to two-sided and multisided platforms as market platforms. The users of a 
technology platform can be either homogeneous or heterogeneous. For a market platform, 
however, there must be two or more heterogeneous user groups, such as buyers and sellers 
(Rochet and Tirole 2003, Gawer 2009b). 
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more sellers making use of the platform, the more intense the competition between 
them. Competition will lead to increased product differentiation, giving buyers a greater 
variety of options. As a result, the platform will attract buyer numbers. As buyer 
numbers increase, the necessary per unit fixed cost for sellers to explore a market 
decreases, and richer demand information can be obtained. Consequently, the platform 
will attract an increasing number of sellers. 
Due to the above characteristics, a market platform can provide a shared marketing 
channel for firms in developing countries, helping them respond to the small dispersed 
demand characteristic of emerging markets. In concrete terms, given the existence of 
indirect network effects, firms associated with a platform are able to trade directly with 
the increasing number of dispersed small buyers in emerging markets. These buyers 
generally have a business base in distribution centers within distant markets, and 
know their local customers’ needs. By simply transacting or communicating with them, 
or by examining the demand of trendy goods will facilitate firms to effectively respond 
to trends in emerging markets. Eventually, based on this rich demand information, the 
platform-affiliated firm is likely to accumulate capabilities regarding develop various 
products appropriate to the needs of emerging market consumers. 
 
4.2 China’s specialized market system 
The most typical market platforms in contemporary China are specialized markets, 
which are wholesale markets specializing in the sale of local products and related goods, 
with scope of broad trade covering the entire country and beyond. Generally, such 
specialized markets are located in industrial clusters. For example, Changshu China 
Apparel City, is located in the Changshu apparel cluster; Shenzhen North Huaqiang 
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Market is located in the Shenzhen electronics cluster; Danyang Eyewear Market is 
located in the Danyang eyewear cluster; and Shaoxing China Textile City is located in 
the Shaoxing long-fiber fabric cluster14. In recent years, the largest specialized market 
in China, called Yiwu China Commodity City (Yiwu Market), has developed in the daily 
necessities industry. This market has survived intense competition from various 
markets to become a powerful distribution center. It handles not only local products but 
also daily necessities made in other industrial clusters across China; its commodities 
are circulated across most of the globe (Ding 2013b). 
  In specialized markets, firms have sufficient trade opportunities. Due to indirect 
network effects, both buyer and seller numbers in a specialized market continuously 
increase. For example, in 1990, Yiwu Market comprised 8,900 shops and was frequented 
by 10,000 visitors a day. Annual transaction volume amounted to CNY 600 million. 
Yiwu commodities were primarily sold to buyers from China’s domestic market. In 2004, 
the number of daily visitors reached 2,140,000, resulting in the number of shops 
increase to 42,000. Annual transaction volume amounted to CNY 26.687 billion, making 
Yiwu the world’s largest marketplace (Ding 2012, Chapter 5). A similar situation can be 
observed in various other Chinese industries such as apparel and consumer electronics 
(Ding 2013b). 
Most specialized market buyers are small merchants operating shops in marketplaces 
in various cities and counties. Their purchasing activities unite specialized markets; 
secondary wholesale markets in various cities; bottom markets in counties and towns; 
and some modern distribution systems, such as supermarkets or e-commerce websites, 
into a specialized market system (Figure 1). This system plays a crucial role in China’s 
                                                   
14 Similar markets exist for home appliances, metal materials, and the automobile industry. 
However, no obvious industrial clusters are located near these markets. 
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domestic distribution. According to Ding (2013b), the share of the so-called CNY 100 
million markets (markets in which transaction volumes exceed CNY 100 million) 
comprise more than 30% of China’s total domestic sales. Considering the fact that there 
are 50,000 marketplaces where transaction volumes are below CNY 100 million (no 
statistical data), the specialized market system is undoubtedly China’s most important 
domestic distribution system. 
Since 2000, globalization has resulted in an increasing number of overseas traditional 
marketplaces to be integrated into the specialized market system (Figure 1). While 
many foreign merchants come to China to make purchases, many Chinese merchants 
have begun travelling to developing countries for trade (Ding 2012, Chapter 6). 
With regard to foreign merchants making purchases in China, we use the Yiwu 
Market as an example. In 2007, nearly 60% of Yiwu Market’s commodities were 
exported, and 260,000 foreigners visited Yiwu. Some foreign buyers reside permanently 
in Yiwu, and many resident offices have been established. In 2006 and 2007 alone, the 
number of foreign resident offices increased from 939 to 1,340. Based on an analysis of 
Yiwu Foreign Resident Office Yearbook, Ding (2012, Chapter 6) discovered that the 
daily necessity buyers switching to Yiwu were mainly based in the UAE and Hong Kong 
previously. Ito (2011) describes a typical case featuring a Kenyan buyer who had long 
purchased from Dubai but decided to switch to Yiwu. 
At the same time, significant number of Chinese merchants began to operate shops in 
existing overseas markets or established new markets themselves. In Africa, for 
example, Chinese merchants operated shops in existing markets located as far apart as 
Ghana and Nigeria in West Africa; Congo in Central Africa; and South Africa, Angola, 
Zambia, and Malawi in Southern Africa. Moreover, they founded new marketplaces in 
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Ghana, Nigeria, Guinea, Cameron, Namibia, and South Africa (Ding 2012, Chapter 6). 
This overseas expansion of the specialized market system is not limited to light 
industrial products such as daily necessities, textiles, and apparel. For example, North 
Huaqiang Market in Shenzhen comprises seven mobile phone submarkets from which 
foreign buyers in Guangzhou and Shenzhen often purchase. Moreover, a marketplace 
selling mobile phones exported from Shenzhen has been established in Dubai (Ding 
2013b). 
  From the perspective of other developing countries, local market integration into the 
specialized market system is accompanied by an overflow of Chinese industrial goods 
into their domestic markets—a process which in turn has strongly impacted local 
industries.15 For example, Iwasaki (2012) reported that numerous apparel companies 
that previously made garments in-house and sold them at Bazar-e Bozorg in Teheran 
had stopped production, and now visit specialized markets in Yiwu and Guangzhou to 
purchase garments rather than produce them in-house. 
 
5. EGVC Governance 
5.1 Market-based governance in EGVCs 
5.1.1 Arm’s-length relationships 
Existing studies clearly indicate that EGVCs’ basic governance pattern is that of the 
market. 
The situation of the motorcycle industry as described by Fujita (2013, pp.27−28) is 
presented as follows: 
 
                                                   
15 Yoshida (2007) is the first study that reported the impact of Chinese products on various 
local industries in sub-Saharan Africa. 
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…the strength of the arm’s-length model of Chinese industrial organisation lay 
in its capacity to achieve low prices. Low entry barriers for both manufacturers 
and suppliers assisted by de facto standardisation enabled a large number of 
firms to enter into production of motorcycles and components, spurring intense 
competition. The benefits of the arm’s-length model also extended to its speed 
in launching new models.  
 
Returning to the mobile phone industry, as Ding and Pan (2013) highlight, typical 
arm’s-length relationships have been observed between design houses and the platform 
provider MTK.  Among MTK’s 500 users, only 134 are licensed users. Unlicensed 
design houses can either acquire MTK chipsets from a Purchasing and Money Platform 
(PMP, i.e., an electric parts purchasing agent), the North Huaqiang Market, or licensed 
companies. MTK have taken almost no measures to curb these unlicensed firms. The 
mobile phone manufacturing process, from development to shipment, exhibits all the 
features of market-based governance, such as low coordination, speed, and flexibility. 
International top-brand mobile phone makers, who generally adopt modular 
governance pattern in GVC, require 6–12 months to develop a new type of mobile phone. 
Chinese mobile phone makers, however, operating under the “market” governance 
pattern can develop and manufacture a mobile phone within 55–60 days. On the other 
hand, the minimum order for each segment of the mobile phone value chain is marginal. 
Integrators are willing to develop new mobile phone models for minimum orders of only 
10,000 units. Since design houses do not need to develop a mould, their minimum 
PCBA(printed circuit board + assembly) order is much smaller—generally 5, 000, or 
even 3, 000 at minimum. 
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Arm’s-length relationships are widely seen in EGVCs, not only in motorcycle and 
mobile phone industries in China but also industries in other developing countries. 
According to Iwasaki’s (2012) observation of the apparel industry in Iran, before moving 
to China, merchants Bonak-Dar in Bazar-e Bozorg in Teheran simply sold products 
from sewing factories directly to retailers and never factored any part in the production 
process. Cooperation among sewing factories, Bonak-Dar, and retailers was poor, 
making Tehran’s apparel cluster a lacklustre industry. 
 
5.1.2 A dynamic perspective of market-based governance 
As stated above, market-based governance is generally at arm’s-length relationships 
in EGVCs. On comparing Ito’s (2011) study of 35 buyers of Yiwu Market and Fah’s (2008) 
survey on 54 narrow fabric firms and 82 shopkeepers that treat narrow fabric in Yiwu 
Market, however, we find that the content of market-based transactions is much richer 
than previously considered. 
Ito’s (2011) study exhibits the “market” dominant governance pattern. According to 
Ito (2011), 35 buyers ranked the advantages of Yiwu Market on a scale of 1–5, as variety 
(4.11), price (4.09), new products (3.77), flexibility (3.71), delivery (3.29), and quality 
(3.06). For the question why they decided to make their purchases in Yiwu, 34 buyers 
replied, giving their reasons as price (66), variety (49), quality (23), delivery (21), and 
new product (17) in terms of importance (using a cumulative score where the most 
important reason is 3, second important reason, 2; third important reason, 1). 
  These results indicate that price and variety are the most important factors 
influencing buyers, instead of quality. This implies that the majority of goods traded in 
Yiwu have lower value-added and a buyer can easily swap suppliers in terms price. We 
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can thus conclude that market-based transactions are the major governance pattern in 
Yiwu’s daily necessities industry.16 
  On the other hand, Fah’s (2008) survey is concerning buyers’ priorities. This study 
indicates a paradoxical result: despite market-based governance patterns, buyers in 
Yiwu Market care more for quality than price. Fah (2008, Illustration 9-27) depicts 
answers from 82 shopkeepers concerning their buyers’ priorities. Degree of importance 
has been classified into the following categories: “do not know,” “less important,” 
“important,” and “very important.” In terms of importance (sum of the share of very 
important or important), the issues for buyers can be ranked as follows: 1: good product 
quality (more than 95%), 2: punctual delivery (more than 95%), 3: wide variety of 
products (92%), 4: quick delivery time (90%), 5: flexibility in small and large orders 
(86%), 6: innovative design capabilities (85%), 7: cheap price (79%), and 8: branded 
products (56%). 
  Being consistent with the priorities of buyers, Fah’s (2008) survey indicates that close 
cooperation exists between firms in Narrow fabric industry in Yiwu. Fah (2008, 
Illustration 9-17) examines cooperation levels between narrow fabric firms and their 
domestic and foreign customers, equipment suppliers, competitors, government, and 
associations. Firms are classified by size into company, factory, and workshop. Degree of 
cooperation is classified as strong, normal, or no cooperation. 
Regarding the relationship with domestic customers, 75% of firms responded that 
they share strong relationships with their domestic customers, while more than 50% of 
firms responded that they share strong relationships with their foreign customers. In 
                                                   
16 It is noteworthy that the factor of variety is as important as price for these buyers. Ding, 
Gokan, and Zhu (2013) built a New Economic Geography model to explain how variety 
stimulates the interaction between buyers and sellers. 
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terms of relationships with equipment suppliers, competitors, government, and 
associations, each type of firm has at least normal relations with each of these partners. 
In general, the larger the firm, the stronger their cooperation (Fah 2008, Illustration 
9-17). 
Illustration 9-18 indicates firms’ reasons for cooperating with other firms. Degree of 
importance has been classified into “do not know,” “less important,” “important,” and 
“very important.” In terms of the degree of importance, the following reasons have been 
chosen: “entering new technology fields,” “share/reduce risks and costs,” “establish 
strategic partnerships,” ”faster time to market,” “know-how transfer,” and “pooled 
financial resources.” Except for “pooled financial resources,” more than half of the firms, 
regardless of size, ranked the above mentioned reasons to be important or very 
important. In general, the larger the firm, the more important they found these reasons. 
Although the sample sizes are too small to provide meaningful statistical conclusions, 
we believe that the qualitative information reflected in these two studies is sufficient to 
subvert our present general understanding of market-based transactions. This 
paradoxical phenomenon must be explained from a dynamic perspective.  
In concrete terms, as a result of economic growth, consumers in emerging markets 
often have a favorable expectation on future income. Buyers from emerging markets 
thus care more for quality than price, even they have to be price-oriented at current 
stage. 
On the other hand, firms in industrial clusters such as Yiwu can contact an increasing 
number of buyers from emerging markets. This indirect network effect implies that 
most firms will have increasingly favorable expectations of undertaking demand 
upgrading and market expansion. In this situation, a firm may initially choose to enter 
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a low-end market and adopt market-based governance. However, because of favorable 
future business expectations, they may strategically strengthen their relationships with 
customers at the incipient stage, and adopt a differentiation strategy in the next stage 
(see Section 6). In contrast, in some industries, such as China’s motorcycle industry and 
Iran’s apparel industry in which firm growth opportunities are relatively small and 
future expectations are not as high as those of firms in Yiwu, arm’s-length transaction 
relationships are likely.  
In this sense, in emerging markets, the market platform plays an important role of 
changing firms’ expectations and stimulating entrepreneurship through drastic market 
expansion and demand upgrading. This yields a new but effective growth path for firms 
in developing countries. 
 
5.2 Platforms and low coordination costs  
5.2.1 Technology platforms and low coordination costs 
Market-based transactions result directly from the platformization of key components 
and the emergence of the specialized market system. 
We earlier discussed the technology platform factor. Here, the relationship between 
the platformization of key components and value chain governance in EGVCs must be 
clarified. As the case of PC and mobile phone industries indicated, platformization 
refers to integrating several key components and some peripheral parts and/or software 
into a single platform. As a result, the platform’s internal architecture changed to 
integral, and the architecture of the finished goods became modular. This ensured a 
product’s fundamental functions while lowering the necessities of explicit coordination 
when manufacturing finished goods.  
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However, two factors made the chain governance pattern often changed from modular 
to market in EGVCs. The first factor is informality. Numerous small firms gather in 
informal sectors in developing countries (Bennett, 2010). As the case of MTK indicated, 
these firms almost do not pay any license fees to technology platform providers. Except 
for price information, no any technology or design information are exchanged between 
them. Typical arm’s-length relationships have thus arisen.  
The second factor is the difficulty of changing some industries’ (e.g., home appliances, 
automobiles, motor cycles) design architecture into complete modular. In these 
industries, although key components are being shared, other components have not been 
completely standardized and the information exchanged between platform providers 
and users has not been well codified as well. The design architectures of finished goods 
thus remain integral or quasi-modular. Fujita (2013) called this phenomenon “de facto 
standardization”, highlighting that it must be distinguished from modularization.  
Interestingly, although compatibility between key components and other components 
is not as high as the modularized case, basic functions of finished goods in these 
industries have been ensured. This is because some fundamental components have been 
integrated into a single platform, and are adjusted to fully fitted with each other. For 
example, in China’s television industry, CRT suppliers usually integrate the CRT and 
deflection yoke into a single platform. In the automobile industry, engine suppliers 
usually integrate engine and transmission into a single platform (Marukawa 2013, 
pp.59-60). 
Marukawa (2013) argues that the unique pattern of China’s value chain governance 
cannot be explained within the analytical framework by Gereffi, Humphrey, and 
Sturgeon (2005). He highlights that in a latecomer country, such as China, foreign 
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suppliers’ capabilities are generally stronger than those of local lead firms. Complicated 
information flows (not only price, but also technological and design-related information) 
thus arise from supplier to lead firms. Marukawa (2013) called this a supportive value 
chain. 
We acknowledge that EGVCs often suffer from weak lead firms. However, it remains 
controversial if technological and design-related information flows exist between 
supplier and lead firms because all relevant information is integrated into the 
technology platform, which is often a black box in most cases. If technological and 
design-related information is transmitted from a platform provider to a lead firm, the 
lead firm will learn from the platform provider and accumulate the related capabilities. 
In fact, however, as discussed in Section 3 (also see Section 6), lead firms find it difficult 
to accumulate capabilities in fields covered by the technology platform itself. In this 
sense, the general governance pattern in EGVCs still can be explained within the GVC 
framework, namely the “market”. 
 
5.2.2 Market platforms and low coordination costs  
The specialized market system is another important factor that strengthens 
market-based governance in EGVCs. 
First, the specialized market system connects a large quantity of low-end emerging 
market demand with China’s industrial clusters—a process that lowers the necessary 
coordination costs for product differentiation and quality control.  
Inspired by Humphrey and Schmitz (2002, 2004), Ding and Pan (2013) highlight that 
the quality of market demand will directly affect the pattern of value chain governance. 
Consumers in developed countries demand more-differentiated products. To meet their 
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needs, accurate and sophisticated product specifications must be drafted. Achieving 
such specifications requires stable transaction relationships and sufficient exchange of 
information concerning product technology and quality control.  
On the other hand, in developed countries’ markets, requirements for quality, safety, 
environmental standards, and other corporate social responsibilities have become 
increasingly strict, and violators are being severely punished. In this situation, avoiding 
such risks requires firms to increase supplier and seller controls. In the GVC context, a 
network or hierarchy type governance is therefore indispensable when making goods for 
markets in developed countries. 
In contrast, the preponderance of low-end demand in emerging markets implies that 
products are less differentiated and lack accurate and sophisticated specifications. 
Furthermore, unlike in developed countries, the burdens of quality, safety, 
environmental standards, and other corporate social responsibilities that firms in 
developing countries face are much smaller. Therefore, in EGVCs, the coordination costs 
necessary for product differentiation and quality control are extremely low, and the 
common governance pattern is more likely to be the market. 
Second, local governments play a crucial role in reducing necessary coordination costs 
for unfamiliar traders to conduct transactions. A large number of potential new buyers 
and sellers exist within emerging markets. In general, to establish mutual trust, 
repeated transactions and costly coordination are indispensable. However, if an 
authoritative third party such as a local government intervenes in the transactions, 
trust can be established more quickly.  
In China, local governments serve as the most important managers of specialized 
markets. As Ding (2012, p.40) indicated, of the 43 specialized markets in Zhejiang, 
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where specialized markets are the most advanced in China, 38 were established by local 
governments. This is one substantial difference between specialized markets and 
markets in other developing countries, such as the Suq.17  
As Ding (2011, p.102) highlighted, in specialized markets, the local government 
strictly punishes sellers who violate the contract and sell fake and/or inferior goods. 
The local government also actively publishes information on each seller’s credibility to 
motivate them to improve. For example, in the Yiwu Market, 50,000 shops have had 
their credibility classified into one of the six ranks. Each shop’s credibility can be 
verified through PCs installed in the market. 
 
6. Upgrading of Lead firms in EGVCs 
In contrast to GVCs, EGVCs offer developing countries more opportunities to foster 
their own lead firms. Section 6 focuses on the upgrading issues by these lead firms. 
Because these firms are still in a growth stage, the following analyses are tentative. 
  From our observations, the largest factor behind the upgrading of lead firms in 
EGVCs is their ability to realize functional upgrading, to lower their reliance on 
platforms and increase their capabilities in the value chain segments where platform 
providers previously played critical roles. At the current stage available for observation, 
this trend is particularly obvious in market platforms. 
As indicated by Sonobe and Otsuka’s (2004) study on China’s several industrial 
clusters, the share of firms’ sales created by specialized markets declines as firms grow 
larger. This occurs because most of these firms, instead of using the shared sales 
                                                   
17 For the situation in the Suq, in which an authoritative third party is missing, and buyers 
and sellers have to engage in complicated clientelization and bargaining to conclude a 
transaction, see Geertz (1978). 
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channels of specialized markets, have constructed their own sales networks and have 
built their own brands. 
However, more detailed studies revealed that specialized markets have greatly 
contributed to lead firms’ improvement of their abilities in marketing, design, and 
branding (Ding 2011, 2012). In marketing, for example, regional groups of merchants, 
as the main actors in the specialized market system, play an important role in 
constructing a firm’s own sales network. For example, in 2006, 1,200 firms in Wenzhou, 
China succeeded in constructing their own sales network. Of the 130,000 sales agents 
that comprise these sales networks, 100,000 (77%) are external Wenzhou merchants, 
who act primarily as previous shopkeepers in the specialized market system (Ding 2011, 
p.95). 
The market platform also helps lead firms to improve their design and branding 
abilities. Ding (2012, Chapter 10) compares three types of Chinese apparel clusters. 
This study indicates that, compared with export-oriented clusters, the specialized 
market-based industrial clusters, although low-end market-oriented, are more likely to 
foster national-level brands. Companies possessing national-level brands appear in 
nearly one-third of the specialized market-based clusters, a finding attributable to the 
fact that buyers in low-end markets are small merchants who are design-takers—a 
status that offers opportunity for local firms to create their own brands.18 On the other 
hand, these small merchants directly purchase from the clusters themselves, bringing 
to the clusters a great deal of information on distant markets. Based on these pieces of 
rich market information, lead firms in the clusters have adequate opportunities to 
                                                   
18 This point is inspired by Bazan, Luiza, and Lizbeth Navas-Aleman (2004), who argues 
that as there are no powerful buyers, firms under market-based governance are more likely 
to realize functional upgrading. 
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formulate their own brand strategies. Initially, they could only create brand-name 
products with low added value, which is nearly the same as being undifferentiated. 
However, some companies survive the intense competition and create national-level 
brands.  
For technology platforms as well, strategies of platform providers directly affect their 
customers’ upgrading paths. In the mobile phone industry, MTK pursues a strategy of 
providing their customers with a highly integrated platform that covers a broad scope of 
R&D activities. It also prevents customers from collaborating in the process of IC 
chipset design, except for debugging. The growth space available to local firms is 
correspondingly limited. 
In contrast, China’s LCD television industry is dominated by six major firms. M-Star, 
a Taiwanese company, is the largest LCD IC provider holding 70% of the market share. 
In contrast with MTK’s strategy, M-Star allows its customers to participate in the 
process of IC chip design, and even sends R&D teams to every customer’s company for 
each project, sometimes going to the extent of opening some source codes for these 
customers. Accordingly, local LCD television makers accumulate capabilities allowing 
them to later develop more differentiated products.19 
 
7. Conclusion 
 The emergence of EGVCs is a natural outcome of recent globalization processes. 
While MNCs increasingly began to adopt a platform strategy for their emerging market 
customers, more marketplaces in developing countries have been integrated into a 
powerful distribution system—China’s specialized market system. Consequently, an 
                                                   
19 Author interview with a former M-Star manager (June 2013). 
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emerging market-oriented industrial organization, called an emerging global value 
chain, has appeared. These EGVCs are formed by a large number of small firms 
together with a small number of large platform providers and display the “market” type 
general governance pattern. 
Lead firms in developing countries generally lack two types of capabilities that limit 
their growth potential. First, they are unable to bear the high fixed costs necessary for 
R&D or marketing activities. Second, they find it difficult to conduct explicit 
coordination required by complicated transactions with global partners. By providing a 
shared stable component within a system product or industry, a platform can resolve 
the issues related to these poor capabilities, stimulating local firms to grow into strong 
lead firms. 
Platforms can be classified as either technology platforms or market platforms. 
Although each type may play different roles in different industries, both types are 
indispensable to EGVC formation. Technology platform is the only factor enabling firms 
in developing countries, as lead firms, to enter technology-intensive sectors such as 
automobiles, motorcycles, PCs and mobile phones. Market platforms, on the other hand, 
enable firms to respond to the highly dispersed and drastically expanding demand 
exhibited by emerging markets.20 
The internal structure of an EGVC is shown in Figure 2.  
In technology platforms, the central box refers to a key component, while the left and 
right boxes refer to peripheral parts, software, and related R&D activities. Due to the 
                                                   
20 The latter point needs particular attention. Traditional economic analyses usually neglect 
the significance of the distribution system upon the production system. To a large extent, 
this has resulted from the fact that the distribution system in developed countries advanced 
before the production system. This has made scholars mostly overlook the difficulties faced 
when marketing in emerging markets. 
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capabilities of platform users to explicit coordination is poor, technology platform 
providers in EGVCs must not only undertake fundamental R&D but also integrate 
some peripheral parts, software, and related R&D activities into the platform.  
In market platforms, the central box refers to the market platform itself, such as a 
specialized market21. The left-side box refers to producers in the EGVC, who generally 
possess poor marketing capabilities, while that of the right refers to small buyers from 
emerging markets, who are highly dispersed and price-oriented. Producers and buyers 
trade directly within the platform. 
Direct network effects arise among technology platform users. The positive feedback 
mechanism of direct network effects allows an increasing number of platform users to 
exchange knowledge and information, and thus learn from each other. They therefore 
gradually accumulate platform-based R&D capabilities. 
Indirect network effects arise among market platform users. The positive feedback 
mechanism of indirect network effects allows an increasing number of producers to 
attract increased numbers of buyers and vice versa. During this process, producers can 
acquire information and knowledge concerning emerging markets, gradually improving 
their ability to market in emerging economies. 
Generally, EGVCs exhibit the “market” governance pattern. Because technology 
platform providers expand their R&D activities’ coverage, most of the necessary explicit 
coordination is conducted within the platform. Coordination costs between technology 
platform providers and users have therefore been reduced. In market platforms, the 
market’s ability to enable sellers to meet the demands of its sizeable but low-end users 
                                                   
21 Recently, e-commerce platforms have played an increasingly important role in EGVCs. 
Future studies should pay more attention on the role of internet in the development of 
EGVCs. 
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implies that product specifications have thus become simpler, and the necessary 
coordination costs between producers and buyers have shown a definite downward 
trend. On the other hand, market platform providers such as local governments 
generally play a crucial role in reducing coordination costs, allowing unfamiliar traders 
to conclude transactions.  
An interesting finding is that, at least in market platforms, market-based governance 
does not necessarily mean pure arm’s-length relations. When the market is rapidly 
expanding and upgrading, platform users form favorable expectations regarding their 
future business. They may strategically concentrate on quality and explicit coordination, 
in spite of the fact that they remain engaged in market-based transactions. 
The growth path of firms in EGVCs differs greatly from that of firms in GVCs. In 
GVCs, firms in developing countries can accumulate capabilities and upgrade by 
trading with and learning from MNCs. Gereffi (1999) offers an optimistic growth path of 
these firms from OEM (Original Equipment Manufacturing) to OBM (Original Brand 
Manufacturing). However, a theoretical study by Humphrey and Schmitz (2000), and 
empirical studies by Bazan, Luiza, and Navas-Alemán (2004) and Navas-Alemán (2006) 
have proved that the governance pattern generated between firms in developing 
countries and MNCs is generally captive (quasi-hierarchical)—a relationship in which 
firms can realize process and product upgrading, but functional upgrading remains 
difficult. 
In contrast, in EGVCs, functional upgrading has indeed been realized, and strong 
lead firms have indeed been nurtured. As discussed in Section 6, upgrading at firm level 
is reflected in the reduced reliance on platform and increased capabilities in value chain 
segments (branding, marketing, complementary R&D) that platform providers 
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previously predominated. Interestingly, platforms (at least market platforms at current 
stage) themselves can help lead firms to improve their design and sales abilities by 
providing information and/or resources. 
Two important issues should be investigated in future studies. The first issue 
concerns upgrading. This paper only discussed upgrading by lead firms. However, at the 
industry level, upgrading reflects the potential for a developing country’s ability to 
nurture its own platforms. Existing evidence indicates that market platforms have been 
nurtured by developing countries themselves, while technology platforms, except for 
some key components in home appliances industry, are still firmly dominated by firms 
from developed countries. It is therefore worth investigating whether EGVCs contribute 
to the formation of a new type of international division of labor, namely one in which 
firms from developed countries provide technology platforms, while those in developing 
countries provide market platforms.22 
The other important issue is whether the experiences of Chinese firms in EGVCs can 
be exported to other developing countries. On one hand, China’s huge domestic market, 
the considerable size of social networks, and the unique role of public sectors must be 
taken into account. However, most developing countries have one or more similar 
conditions. The problem arises from the fact that at their current stage, firms from 
these emerging economies are only able to become buyers within EGVCs. How can these 
firms develop into strong lead firms? This will be a crucial point for the future study of 
EGVCs. 
 
                                                   
22 The company of Spreadtrum in mobile phone industry is an exception. This company was 
established by persons who previously studied in USA and has become a main supplier of 
the mobile phone IC chipset. Up until to now, however, Spreadtrum has merely followed 
MTK’s strategy. 
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